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The 1990s began in South Africa with some dramatic changes.
In early February, State President F. W. De Klerk made a speech
which many took as an indication that he was serious about trans-
forming South Africa.1 The measures announced included: ending
the ban of the African National Congress ("ANC"), the Pan-Afri-
canist Congress ("PAC"), the South African Communist Party, and
other groups; 2 the lifting of restrictions on thirty-three other organiza-
tions including the powerful Congress of South African Trade Un-
ions; the release of most political prisoners; the lifting of restrictions
on 374 freed detainees; the limiting of detention without trial to six
months, with provision for legal representation and medical treat-
ment; and, a moratorium on hangings. 3 De Klerk also indicated that
he would free ANC leader Nelson Mandela, perhaps the world's most
famous political prisoner, after twenty-seven years in jail.4 Mandela's
release a few days later sparked jubilation from many of his compatri-
* J.D., University of Texas; Ph.D., Yale University; Member of the Texas Bar. The
author, a Postdoctoral Fellow, Lecturer in Law, and Assistant Coordinator of the Career De-
velopment Fellowship Program for Black Southern Africans at Yale, is also a regular consult-
ant to the Ford Foundation on South African and Namibian issues.
1. Kraft, Sweeping Reforms in South Africa, L.A. Times, Feb. 3, 1990, at At, col. 6.
2. The history of these groups is described in T. LODGE, BLACK POLITICS IN SOUTH
AFRICA SINCE 1945 (1983).
3. L.A. Times, Feb. 3, 1990, at A10, col. 2.
4. Id. at Al, col. 6. On Mandela, see F. MEER, HIGHER THAN HOPE: THE AUTHOR-
IZED BIOGRAPHY OF NELSON MANDELA (1990).
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ots as millions watched worldwide. Mandela proceeded to tour nu-
merous foreign countries where he was greeted by adoring crowds.
At home, the ANC held meetings with the government on "talks
about talks" and set up offices throughout South Africa. Organizing
by other unbanned groups also went into high gear. In June, De
Klerk announced the lifting of the four-year-old state of emergency
for all of South Africa except Natal Province. In Natal, fighting be-
tween those loyal to Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's rural, Zulu In-
katha movement and supporters of the broad-based, anti-apartheid
coalition known as the Mass Democratic Movement ("MDM") con-
tinued to claim numerous African lives. 5
Many came to believe the promise of De Klerk's February
speech that "[h]enceforth, everybody's political points of view will be
tested against their realism, their workability and their fairness. The
time for negotiation has arrived." 6 Graffiti in some African town-
ships even proclaimed, "Viva Comrade De Klerk!". Yet, the eupho-
ria quickly evaporated as people recognized that despite the
unprecedented occurrences, the main pillars of apartheid-the Na-
tives Land Act, the Group Areas Act, and the Population Registra-
tion Act-remained intact.7 At the same time, the government was
steadfast in its refusal to release prisoners sentenced for offenses such
as murder, terrorism, and arson on behalf of political organizations.
To make matters worse, by November, South Africa teetered peril-
ously on the brink of collapsing in internecine convulsions as black
South Africans, allegedly with police complicity, brutalized and mur-
dered each other in areas throughout the country in conflicts fueled
by urban-rural, class, and ethnic tensions. 8 De Klerk ordered an in-
vestigation into the situation in response to ANC allegations of gov-
ernment involvement. Nevertheless, it was clear that any new system
would have to provide sufficient human rights guarantees so as to pre-
vent a new South Africa from being baptized in blood.
For both supporters of the government and anti-apartheid
groups such as the ANC, this realization has led to an insistence that
the future constitution of South Africa contain a bill of rights to be
interpreted by an independent judiciary. However, that is where the
5. Newsday, June 11, 1990, at 40 (city ed.).
6. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1990, § 1, at 6, col. 5.
7. L.A. Times, Feb. 3, 1990, at A12, col. 1. This legislation is described in L. THOMP-
SON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA (1990) and L. THOMPSON & A. PRIOR, SOUTH AFRICAN
POLITICS (1982).
8. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1990.
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agreement ends. Closer examination reveals two radically different
conceptions of such a document. Black South Africans want a bill of
rights which guarantees majority rule, as well as political, cultural,
and economic rights. In contrast, white South Africans want the doc-
ument to protect minority group rights and are concerned with poten-
tial loss of property due to forced redistribution.
Both sides are alike in their failure to give sufficient attention to
South Africa's legal heritage, particularly the role of its all-white judi-
ciary. All too often, this judiciary has behaved as the pawn of the
executive. It is this legal heritage, including the failure of the white
minority to create respect for the rule of law among blacks, that will
inevitably play a decisive role in the fate of any bill of rights. Ulti-
mately, the entire legal system will have to be transformed before any
constitution can be successful.
This Article proposes that some progress can be made toward
such a transformation if South Africa adopts a constitution with an
Africanist bill of rights, and the judiciary interprets it in accordance
with international human rights standards. First, this Article ex-
plores the bill of rights debate currently raging in South Africa. The
next section offers suggestions for an Africanist bill of rights. Finally,
the Article calls for the judiciary to adhere to international human
rights standards in construing that bill of rights and analyzes the ob-
stacles to the successful implementation of such an approach.
II. THE SOUTH AFRICAN BILL OF RIGHTS DEBATE
A. Background
When the British colonies of the Cape of Good Hope and Natal
joined with the two former Afrikaner republics of the Orange Free
State and the Transvaal in 1910 to form the Union of South Africa,
the country adopted a system of parliamentary supremacy.9 This
meant that, with the exception of certain entrenched constitutional
clauses that had to be amended by a special procedure,10 all legislation
that passed by a simple parliamentary majority became the supreme
law of the land.II Unlike the United States, where judges are free to
declare legislation unconstitutional, South Africa had nothing but
custom to check parliamentary excesses. In the new polity, such cus-
9. The process of unification is described fully in L. THOMPSON, THE UNIFICATION OF
SOUTH AFRICA 1902-1910 (1960).
10. SOUTH AFRICA CONST. art. 99, § 3.
11. Id. art. 99, § 1.
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tom was lacking with regard to blacks.12 Accordingly, the Parliament
passed many discriminatory and repressive laws after the formation of
the Union.1 3  The number of such discriminatory laws grew
prodigiously after 1948 when the National Party came to power with
its "apartheid" slogan. 14
Although the concept of the rule of law has generated countless
pages of writing, four generalizations are apposite. 5 First, there must
be representative government, or to use Abraham Lincoln's phrase,
the government must be "of the people, by the people, [and] for the
people."' I 6 Second, there must be acceptance of the notion of equality
before the law. Third, there must be procedural and substantive lim-
its on government action against the individual. Fourth, review by an
independent judiciary must be a central mechanism for constitutional
enforcement. Central to the viability of the rule of law concept is the
assumption that the legislature will adhere to such principles in all its
decision making. Thus, fundamental freedoms will not be abrogated
arbitrarily by the state.
With regard to blacks, the South African legislature has never
adhered to the rule of law. Only by abrogating black rights has the
white-minority regime been able to ensure its survival. Particularly in
the post-1948 years, the government has continually enlarged its arse-
nal of security legislation. Since 1983, the government has concen-
trated significantly greater powers in the hands of the executive.'
7
According to South African jurist J. D. van der Vyver,
[i]nstead of applying its supremacy, in accordance with the histori-
cal purpose of a sovereign parliament, to keep a tight rein on the
12. Custom has, however, been sufficient to restrain parliamentary actions in Britain,
from which South Africa took its model. The distinguishing factors in Britain were: 1) the
progressive extension of the franchise to incorporate all elements of society, in contrast to the
South African case where the franchise became less inclusive in the years after Union, and 2) a
tradition of respect for the notion of the rule of law. On parliamentary supremacy in Britain,
see J. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1955).
13. See generally Berat, Conscientious Objection in South Africa: Governmental Paranoia
and the Law of Conscription, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 128, 131-35 (1989).
14. See generally id.; L. THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 190-95 (1990).
15. South African writings on this concept include Beinart, The Rule of Law, ACTA
JURIDICA 101 (1962); Budlender, Law and Lawlessness in South Africa, 4 S. AFR. J. HUM.
RTS. 139 (1988); Molteno, The Rules Behind the Rule of Law, ACTA JURIDICA 136-37 (1965-
66).
16. Address by Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (Nov. 19, 1863), reprinted
in A. LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865 536 (1989).
17. See generally Berat, supra note 13, at 158-76; Berat, Doctors, Detainees and Torture:
Medical Ethics v. the Law in South Africa, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 499, 528-31 (1989).
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powers of government, the South African legislature on the con-
trary utilized its dominant authority to confer on the bureaucracy
extensive, and in many instances excessive or even arbitrary, com-
petencies-thereby converting the de iure institution of parliamen-
tary sovereignty into a de facto state of executive supremacy .... 
8
Underlying this executive-minded behavior has been an obsession
with legalism among the Nationalists. There is a law for everything,
and, in the Nationalists' view, such laws, no matter how draconian,
are lawful simply because they are the law.
Reinforcing this obsession with legalism has been the all-white,
and nearly all-male, South African judiciary, which has been loath to
challenge the executive. Supporters of the judiciary have argued that
the judges have merely been acting in accordance with their proper
role in a system of parliamentary supremacy (i.e., to declare the law
and not to make it).19 The judges' task is only to see that the manner
of promulgation is procedurally correct and that executive action is
taken in accordance with the legislation.
In practice, however, this positivist justification has been an ex-
cuse for the generally conservative judges, many of whom are Na-
tional Party supporters, to lend approval to the underlying moral
assumptions of the legislation that they are called upon to construe.
South African jurist M. G. Cowling has argued that "within the
framework of legislative supremacy, the positivistic approach to judi-
cial decision-making provides an extremely convenient cloak behind
which judges can hide their 'inarticulate major premisses' by attribut-
ing inequitable results to the legislator."' 20 According to Cowling,
these premises are the "underlying motives, perceptions, [and] polit-
ical outlook[s]" 21 that mold a judge's interpretation of the law as it is
envisioned by the legislature. In the South African case, it is not im-
plausible to suggest that, for many judges, such premises include be-
liefs in white domination and continued hegemony, the need to
preserve state security, and fear of communism.
The unhappy result of the judiciary's captivity to such premises
18. Van der Vyver, Parliamentary Sovereignty, Fundamental Freedoms and a Bill of
Rights, 99 S. AFR. L.J. 557, 575 (1982).
19. Basson, Judicial Activism in a State of Emergency: An Examination of Recent Deci-
sions of the South African Courts, 3 S. AR. J. HUM. RTs. 28, 42-43 (1987).
20. Cowling, Judges and the Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: Articulating the
Inarticulate Premiss, 3 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTrs. 177, 189 (1987); see also Dugard, The Judicial
Process, Positivism, and Civil Liberty, 88 S. AFR. L.J. 181 (1971).
21. Cowling, supra note 20, at 189.
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has been that, instead of protecting human rights, the courts--espe-
cially the Appellate Division-have routinely upheld the draconian
will of the executive. In many cases involving security legislation,
most recently in Omar v. Minister of Law and Order, Fani v. Minister
of Law and Order, and Bill v. State President,22 the courts have de-
ferred to the executive's authority in matters concerning state secur-
ity. Such cases reveal that the judiciary, in its refusal to protect even
the most basic civil liberties, is largely a rubber stamp for executive
decisions. Indeed, some South African scholars have even suggested
that more liberal judges should resign in an effort to underscore the
proposition that it is inappropriate to speak of an independent judici-
ary under present conditions.
23
Views such as these have led to calls for a redefinition of the role
of the South African judiciary so that it can become an effective
guardian of human rights. There have been demands for the intro-
duction of a bill of rights to effectuate such a change which would
give the judiciary standards for protecting human rights by "restrict-
ing the competence of persons in authority to curtail those rights and
freedoms by means of legislative or administrative interference.
'24
Consequently, some scholars have argued that a South African bill of
rights would free judges from the constraints of legislative supremacy,
providing a "recourse to a positive human rights standard that oper-
ates independently of the legislative will and to which the latter
[would] be subordinated. 25 Without a bill of rights, there would be a
penumbra surrounding the institutional jurisdiction for the protection
of civil liberties. Thus, the argument goes, the entrenchment of a bill
of rights not only would protect individual rights and freedoms, but
also would serve to promote the institutional integrity of the
judiciary.
26
Even as progressive scholars have sought a bill of rights, con-
servative members of the politico-legal establishment have also turned
their attention in that direction. However, their interest springs not
from their desire to nurture the rule of law in a nonracial democratic
22. 1987(3) S.A. 859 (App. Div.) (S. Afr.) (Omar, Fani, and Bill were consolidated on
appeal).
23. See generally Wacks, Judges and Injustice, 101 S. AFR. L.J. 266 (1984); Dugard,
Should Judges Resign?-A Reply to Professor Wacks, 101 S. AFR. L.J. 286 (1984).
24. Weeramantry, The Constitutional Reconstruction of South Africa: Some Essential
Safeguards, 3 LESOTHO L.J. 1, 16 (1987); Van der Vyver, supra note 18, at 582-83.
25. Cowling, supra note 20, at 196.
26. Weeramantry, supra note 24, at 15.
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state, but from their perception that the days of white-minority rule
are numbered and that a bill of rights is the best way of safeguarding
property and minority rights. 27 With such disparate views, it is not
surprising that disagreements over what form such a document
should take are profound.
B. Substantive Content of a New Bill of Rights
A bill of rights can incorporate three types of rights.28 First, pro-
cedural rights guarantee that the individual is subject to a judicial
process that ensures equal treatment under the law, impartiality, and
fairness. Second, substantive rights protect fundamental freedoms
such as freedom of expression, movement, assembly, association, and
franchise, and may also include group rights. Procedural and sub-
stantive rights appear almost universally in bills of rights. Third, eco-
nomic rights guarantee the individual's basic material needs such as
employment and housing. These frequently include freedom from
hunger, access to free medical care, and free education (in some cases
even tertiary education).
1. Economic Rights
This last category of rights can be described as the right to ex-
pect. Though they were not historically part of Western constitu-
tions, economic rights are increasingly being incorporated into the
constitutions of many social democracies in third world states.29 Eco-
nomic rights differ from procedural and substantive rights because, as
South African historian T. R. H. Davenport has written, they reflect
a departure from the strictly individualist view of society to which
the more basic civil liberties seem logically to belong, by laying
down social and economic standards which must be realized if the
individual is to be able to exercise his basic freedoms with profit to
himself and the community.30
The South African debate surrounding a bill of rights centers on
the concepts of economic and minority rights. Many aligned with the
MDM believe that any proposed bill of rights must ensure, or at least
27. See, e.g., S. AFR. L. COMM'N, PROJECT 58: GROUP AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1989)
[hereinafter S. AFR. L. COMM'N REP.].
28. Davis, Human Rights-A Re-Examination, 97 S. AFR. L.J. 94, 95 (1980).
29. See, e.g., REPUBLIC OF INDIA CONST. part IV, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 14-15 (1986); see also REPUBLIC OF IRELAND CONST. art. 45,
reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 72 (1988).
30. Davenport, Civil Rights in South Africa, 1910-1960, ACTA JURIDICA 11, 12 (1960).
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must not obstruct, the economic redistribution that must follow the
abolition of the apartheid state. If there is no state-directed economic
redress, the argument goes, the members of the white community will
simply substitute their current racially-defined supremacy with an ec-
onomically-defined one reflecting their already superior economic sta-
tus, a status acquired at the expense of blacks.3' Moreover, the
guarantee of certain minimal economic standards will be the only way
of infusing meaning into the blacks' newly-secured political rights.
As black advocate Ernest Moseneke contends, "[t]he right to develop-
ment . . . is probably more crucial than the right to vote; not as a
favour which somebody hands out, but a right that you can claim and
enforce... anything less than that is going to in effect perpetuate the
present system."'32
For many blacks, capitalism, as practiced in South Africa, and
civil liberty, as propounded by the government and judiciary, are
wedded in a conspiracy of oppression aimed at preserving and perpet-
uating inequality in economic relations. In this context, the concern
of the ANC is not so much with individual property rights as it is
with the enormous concentration of capital in a few huge, white-con-
trolled corporations and holding companies. Drawing from the 1955
Freedom Charter, 33 the ANC's draft constitutional guidelines pro-
posed in 1989 emphasized the need to vest the state with "the right to
determine the general context in which economic life takes place and
define and limit the rights and obligations attaching to the ownership
and use of productive capacity."' 34 The document distinguished be-
tween individual property owners and the collective wealth of the cor-
porations. Accordingly, it envisioned that "[p]roperty for personal
use and consumption shall be constitutionally protected, '35 while pri-
vately-owned companies and transnational corporations "shall be
obliged to co-operate with the state in realising the objectives of the
31. Davis, Legality and Struggle: Towards a View of a Bill of Rights for South Africa, in A
BILL OF RIGHTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA 179 (J. van der Westhuizen & H. Viljoen 1988).
32. Panel Discussion, in A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA 149 (J. van der Westhu-
izen & H. Viljoen 1988) (quoting E. Moseneke).
33. On June 26, 1955, three thousand delegates of all racial groups met at Kliptown, near
Johannesburg, and adopted a Freedom Charter which, among other things, stipulated that
"South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white .. " FREEDOM CHARTER, pream-
ble, reprinted in 3 FROM PROTEST TO CHALLENGE 205 (T. Karis & G. Carter 1977).
34. AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES FOR A DEMO-
CRATIC SOUTH AFRICA, cl. o (1989) [hereinafter ANC CONST. GUIDELINES].
35. Id. cl. t.
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Freedom Charter in promoting social well-being."' 36
The inclusion of provisions such as this in a new bill of rights
will, no doubt, fail to calm white fears of expropriation and, at the
same time, will anger blacks, whose societies have been destroyed by
the government's policy of forced removals. Failure to deal with the
land question will not win the confidence of the black constituents.
Yet, if Namibia, which is confronted with a similar problem, is any
indication, the new government may not be able to develop a policy
acceptable to both sides for some time after independence; and, per-
haps, it never will.
The government has not offered any solutions capable of satisfy-
ing both whites and blacks, and has favored maintaining the status
quo with regard to the protection of existing property rights. This
preference manifested itself in the South African Law Commission's
1989 Working Paper on Group and Human Rights.3 7 The Commis-
sion, established in 1973 by an Act of Parliament, consisted of mem-
bers of the judiciary, the legal profession (including academic
lawyers), the magistrates' bench, and officials of the Department of
Justice. Its mandate was "to investigate and make recommendations
on the definition and protection of group rights in the context of the
South African constitutional set-up and the possible extension of the
existing protection of individual rights as well as the role the courts
play or should play. ' ' 38 The Commission stressed that economic
rights should be protected only "in the negative sense that legislation
and executive acts shall not infringe them. A bill of rights is not the
place for enforcing positive obligations against the state."' 39
A number of white legal scholars have justified this resistance to
any constitutional guarantees of economic redistribution with argu-
ments that revolve around the judiciary's lack of competence to deal
with such matters. Legal scholar Cowling and Natal Judge John
Didcott both contend that the judiciary is ill-equipped to deal with
issues of economic policy.4° Therefore, they believe that a bill of
rights should be free of economic standards to which the central gov-
ernment would be bound and the judiciary obliged to review. As to
property rights, they insist that the judges be neither spoilers of eco-
36. Id. cl. p.
37. See generally S. AFR. L. COMM'N REP., supra note 27.
38. Id. introduction, 4.
39. Id. 9.1.
40. Didcott, Practical Workings of a Bill of Rights, in A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR SOUTH
AFRICA 60 (J. van der Westhuizen & H. Viljoen 1988); Cowling, supra note 20, at 179.
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nomic redistribution nor rubber stamps for arbitrary expropriation.
They are determined that there be a "neutral" bill of rights to act as a
"shield" and not a "sword. ' 41 Both scholars maintain that this neu-
trality is crucial because South African judges are neither qualified
nor in possession of the resources and enforcement capabilities neces-
sary to adjudicate issues arising out of economic restructuring.
42
Such questions are "political" problems and are not germane to juris-
dictional deliberation.
Unfortunately, these observers fail to explain why the judges
would be ill-equipped to pass on such matters. An explanation can be
found in the Law Commission's report, which distinguishes between
positive and negative rights.43 Substantive rights seek to prevent the
state from infringing upon individual liberties, while economic rights
seek to compel the state to fulfill an obligation. Thus, it is for the
judges to determine that the state has acted arbitrarily and not that it
has failed to comply with minimal economic guarantees.
This argument, however, is unpersuasive. If the judges can as-
certain whether the state has abrogated fundamental freedoms, such
as freedom of the press or speech, they certainly ought to be able to
determine whether the government has failed to strive for the mini-
mum economic standards enshrined in the Constitution. To suggest
that these are political problems inappropriate for adjudication is to
engage in perpetuating the positivist myth upon which the South Afri-
can judiciary has relied for decades.
South African legal scholar John Dugard has taken the middle
ground. He contends that property rights are not the sine qua non of
a bill of rights.44 Rather, rights of expropriation, with delayed or re-
duced compensation, can furnish the means of obtaining economic
redress. While many black Africans may feel that compensation is
unnecessary because the whites stole the land from them, the new
government will still have to recognize international economic reali-
ties. If there is no adequate compensation, international corporations
and banks will undoubtedly consider the country a poor risk, and the
massive investment required to improve the South African people's
standard of living will never materialize. 45 Even accepting Dugard's
41. Didcott, supra note 40, at 58-60.
42. Cowling, supra note 20, at 179.
43. S. AFR. L. COMM'N REP., supra note 27, at summary, 9.1.
44. Dugard, The Quest for a Liberal Democracy in South Africa, ACTA JURIDICA 237,
252-53 (1987).
45. See generally Berat, Namibia: The Road to Independence and the Problem of Succes-
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suggestion about compensation, there is still no reason why property
rights cannot be incorporated into a bill of rights as well.
2. Conflict Between Minority and Group Rights
With regard to minority rights, the South African government
has insisted that these be protected in any bill of rights. The Law
Commission's report drew a distinction between political group rights
and other group values, such as culture, religion, and language.
46 It
determined that the latter should be protected as individual rights in
the bill of rights and that the former should be protected in the body
of the constitution. The ANC's Constitutional Guidelines also recog-
nize the freedom of culture, religion, and language as individual
rights.4
7
The idea of group political guarantees, however, is at odds with a
document that provides for "a system of universal suffrage based on
the principle of one person, one vote."' 48  Perhaps this explains why,
in October of 1990, the government appeared to back away from its
insistence on group political rights. The Deputy Constitutional Min-
ister, Roelf Meyer, stated that the government had abandoned the
"notion of demanding recognition of 'group rights' based on race or
color 'in any form whatsoever.' -49 Despite his rejection of the group
rights approach, however, Meyer indicated that the government was
looking at various constitutional mechanisms established elsewhere to
protect the white minority, primarily a bill of rights.50
It seems that no constitution will ever receive black acceptance
unless it creates the perception that it is bias free. The protection of
minority interests will perpetuate existing inequalities and diminish or
destroy the new government's credibility. If a new government is
truly committed to the rule of law by protecting individual rights,
there will be no need for minority rights.
Whites are not easily persuaded by such statements. After all,
they well know that their representatives have long used the law as an
instrument of oppression. What would prevent a black-dominated
sion of States, in GOVERNMENTS-IN-EXILE (Y. Shain 1991) (forthcoming), reprinted in 18 J.
POL. Sci. 33 (1990) (discussing the compensation dilemma in the Namibian context).
46. S. AFR. L. COMM'N REP., supra note 27, at summary, 8.
47. ANC CONST. GUIDELINES, supra note 34, at cls. g, h, 1.
48. Id. cl. e.
49. Ottaway, South Africa Drops "Group Rights" Idea as Shield for Whites, Wash. Post,
Oct. 5, 1990, at A29.
50. Id.
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government from behaving in a similar fashion? Moreover, life under
apartheid has made it impossible for many whites to conceive of a
unitary, nonracial state. Their world view is one of ever-competing
black and white nationalisms. For them, as historian T. R. H. Daven-
port has noted,
[t]he frontiers of nationalism tend to stop short with the frontiers
of the in-group, to which the rights of out-groups are really irrele-
vant since they are presumed to be antagonistic. The nationalist,
moreover, tends not to think in universals, for the very concept of
universality makes nonsense of nationalist group particularism.
51
Accordingly, the challenge for drafters of a bill of rights is to create a
document acceptable to both sides. One possible way of doing so is to
create a document that is both Africanist and internationalist at the
same time. Such a document should adhere to international stan-
dards of human rights, particularly those which enjoy broad accept-
ance in the rest of Africa.
III. FORMING AN AFRICANIsT BILL OF RIGHTS
International human rights norms are contained in many docu-
ments. In the African context, the most relevant is the African Char-
ter on Human and Peoples' Rights, popularly known as the Banjul
Charter. 52 Adopted in 1981 as a regional treaty by the Organization
of African Unity ("OAU"), the Banjul Charter entered into force
only five years later in October 1986, contrary to most expectations.
Thus far, it has been ratified or acceded to by thirty-five African
states-some two-thirds of the OAU members. 53 This makes it the
largest regional human rights agreement in existence. 54 While most of
the states that are party to the charter have failed to actualize its lofty
51. Davenport, supra note 30, at 25.
52. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Organization of African Unity,
(1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) [hereinafter Banjul Charter].
53. OAU member states party to the charter are: Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina
Faso, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Egypt, Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Ni-
geria, Rwanda, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, Sio Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
54. For example, twenty-one states are parties to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (popularly
known as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms) [hereinafter European Convention]. Nineteen states are parties to the American
Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/ser. L/V/
11.23, doc. 21, rev. 2 (1969), reprinted in R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN-
STRUMENTS 190.1 [hereinafter American Convention].
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ideals, the document is still significant because it reflects the African
affirmation of international human rights standards.5 5 It also fur-
nishes the African viewpoint regarding possible solutions to the issues
of economic and group rights.
For South Africa, use of many of the charter's tenets in a bill of
rights would enable the country to create a truly Africanist jurispru-
dence and, at the same time, express solidarity with the rest of the
international community on key human rights issues. Adherence to
such principles could make South Africa a role model for its respect
of human rights not only in Africa, but throughout the world. This is
a rather lofty goal, but one certainly worth striving for.
The Banjul Charter enumerates various individual rights and
freedoms, many of which are recognized in other African constitu-
tions. Among them are the rights to: nondiscriminatory treatment;
56
equality and equal protection under the law;57 life;58 the respect of
human dignity;59 liberty;60 to have one's cause heard, i.e., the right to
certain minimum standards during legal proceedings; 61 freedom of
conscience and religion; 62 freedom of expression and dissemination of
opinion;63 freedom of association; 64 freedom of assembly; 65 freedom of
movement;66 participation in government;67 and access to public serv-
ices and public property. 68 In this respect the charter has much in
common with other international human rights instruments such as
the United Nations Charter 69 and regional instruments such as the
55. Banjul Charter, supra note 52, preamble.
56. Id. art. 2.
57. Id. art. 3.
58. Id. art. 4.
59. Id. art. 5.
60. Id. art. 6.
61. Id. art. 7.
62. Id. art. 8.
63. Id. art. 9.
64. Id. art. 10.
65. Id. art. 11.
66. Id. art. 12.
67. Id. art. 13.
68. Id.
69. U.N. CHARTER. The U.N. Charter was signed on June 26, 1945 and entered into
force on October 24, 1945. To date the charter has been amended on three occasions: arts. 23,
27, and 61, G.A. Res. 1991 A & B, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 21, U.N. Doc. A/5515
(1963); art. 109, G.A. Res. 2101, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 90, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965); and art. 61, G.A. Res. 2847, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 67, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1971).
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European 70 and American7' Conventions. Though the impetus for
the charter was to reflect an African conception of human rights, the
drafters recognized that it would be imprudent to deviate too much
from norms established in other international human rights instru-
ments. Thus, the charter not only reflects an African conception of
human rights, but additionally demonstrates an acceptance of the
concept that human rights are universal and "transcend the bounda-
ries of nation, race, and belief."
'72
At the same time, the charter is unique among international and
human rights treaties in that it enumerates both civil and political
rights as well as economic, social, and cultural rights. The inclusion
of all these various rights indicates that the two basic categories of
rights are fundamentally important and intertwined. It also reflects
the drafters' rejection of the argument by some South African jurists
that the second category of rights is not justiciable.73 Nowhere does
the charter suggest that civil and political rights are inferior to, or
capable of suspension by, the government in order to promote eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights, or vice versa.
The economic, social, and cultural rights guaranteed to individu-
als include the right to: work, and to receive equal pay for equal
work;74 enjoy the best attainable physical and mental health;75 and
receive an education. 76 However, from a practical standpoint, most
African countries-and a majority-ruled South Africa would be no
exception-are not in a position to guarantee such rights since their
economies are not sufficiently developed (e.g., the right to work) and
the necessary infrastructure is absent (e.g., the rights to health and
education). Nevertheless, even though it may take many years before
the state can ensure full implementation of these rights, inclusion of
the rights will mandate that existing public facilities be made available
to all persons on a nondiscriminatory basis77 and will provide mini-
mum standards by which state actions can be judged. For example,
the charter requires nondiscrimination in the allocation of govern-
70. European Convention, supra note 54.
71. American Convention, supra note 54.
72. South West Africa Case, Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. 6, 296 (dissenting opinion of
Judge Tanaka).
73. See generally Addo, The Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 14
COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 1425 (1988).
74. Banjul Charter, supra note 52, art. 15.
75. Id. art. 16.
76. Id. art. 17.
77. Id. arts. 2, 19.
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ment economic resources. 7 Thus, any government allocation of re-
sources depriving community members of essential services for
reasons unrelated to economic feasibility or general principles of pro-
portionality could be declared unconstitutional by the courts. The
judiciary's role in enforcing such economic rights has been demon-
strated in recent years by the Indian Supreme Court which, guided by
specific directives contained in the Indian Constitution, has freely de-
veloped the common law.
79
The charter also includes the right to own property. 80 This right
appears in the First Protocol to the European Convention, but is no-
tably absent from both United Nations Covenants on Human
Rights.81 This right is also consistent with Dugard's middle path on
expropriation with just compensation.8 2 Under the charter, the right
to property may be encroached upon only for public purposes or "in
the general interest of the community and in accordance with the pro-
visions of appropriate laws."' 83 At the same time, the state has an
obligation of "promoting international economic cooperation based
on mutual respect, equitable exchange, and the principles of interna-
tional law."'84 This implies that the nationalization of property or
business assets owned by foreigners, such as multinational corpora-
tions, is lawful only if the government complies with the appropriate
international legal standards, including the payment of just compen-
sation. In cases of expropriation or nationalization, courts would be
free to ascertain whether the state has overstepped its bounds in tak-
ing property. Thus, a bill of rights based on the Banjul Charter would
satisfy the economic concerns of both sides in South Africa.
The charter also provides guidance on the issue of group rights.
A unique aspect of the Banjul Charter is its inclusion of rights attribu-
table to "peoples." These rights, which appear even in the title, dis-
tinguish it from the European and American Conventions. The
78. Id. art. 13.
79. See generally Bhagwati, Fundamental Rights in Their Economic, Social, and Cultural
Context, in COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COLLOQIUM IN
BANGALORE (Feb. 24-26, 1988).
80. Banjul Charter, supra note 52, art. 14.
81. Compare id. and Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 with International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 1 and International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
82. Dugard, supra note 44, at 252-53.
83. Banjul Charter, supra note 52, art. 14.
84. Id. art. 21(3).
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charter drafters believed that peoples' rights were central to the Afri-
can conception of human rights. These rights reflect the importance
of the community in African culture, particularly because collective
agricultural and other efforts have often proven to be essential to en-
suring survival. In African customary law, individuals took their
identity from the group. Thus, expulsion from the group was one of
the most serious punishments that could be inflicted on an
individual.
85
In actuality, peoples' rights under the charter are the rights of
the individual. 86 No new rights have been created, and accordingly
no new rights have arisen for adjudication. However, given the legacy
of apartheid with its deliberate attempt to classify everyone as a mem-
ber of a racially or ethnically-defined group, a reference to peoples'
rights in a South African bill of rights might appear to furnish a
means of perpetuating divisions. Thus, to guard against the rise of
vocal minorities clamoring for special treatment based on a misinter-
pretation of the phrase, it would be best to incorporate only individual
rights with no special provisions protecting group rights. As long as
individual freedoms are guaranteed, people will be free to band to-
gether as they please. Certainly, this has been the case elsewhere in
the decolonized world, most notably in Zimbabwe and Namibia,
where little has changed in the exclusivist world of social relations.
The horrors of apartheid, particularly within the migrant labor
system, have all but destroyed the family unit in South Africa. The
charter attempts to rectify this situation by providing that the family
"shall be the natural unit and basis of society." 87 It charges the state
with the duty to: safeguard the physical, health, and moral welfare of
the family;88 assist the family, which is the custodian of moral and
traditional values recognized by the community;89 eliminate discrimi-
nation against women; 90 and protect internationally recognized wo-
85. INTERNATIONAL COMMIrEE OF JURISTS, SEMINAR ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN A ONE-
PARTY STATE 65 (1978).
86. On the concept of peoples' rights, see generally Report of the Secretary-General on
the draft African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 1981, CAB/LEG Draft Rapt.
Rpt (II) Rev. 4, at 4; Kiwanuka, The Meaning of "People" in the African Charter on Human
Rights and Peoples' Rights, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 8 (1988); Mumba, Prospects for Regional Projec-
tion for Human Rights in Africa, HOLDSWORTH L. REV. 101, 106 (1982).
87. Banjul Charter, supra note 52, art. 18.
88. Id. art. 18(1).
89. Id. art. 18(2).
90. Id. art. 18(3).
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men's and children's rights.91 This family-oriented approach, framed
in terms of positive obligations, differs from that taken in the Euro-
pean92 and American 93 Conventions, which merely provide for the
absence of interference in family life. The charter reflects the drafters'
belief in the family-including the extended family-as central to Af-
rican values.94 This approach would find wide acceptance among
black South Africans who have witnessed the crumbling of family life
under white domination. It would also satisfy whites, particularly
Afrikaners who often stress their commitment to family life. Finally,
family guarantees in a South African bill of rights can provide guiding
principles for judges called upon to assess the government's compli-
ance with social legislation and to formulate social policies.
The Banjul Charter has an unparalleled approach, placing obli-
gations and requirements on the individual as well as the state. In
South Africa, these duties would demand the commitment of all to
reconciliation. It is not enough for individuals merely to expect pro-
tection from the state. Rather, they should participate actively in the
creation of a more just social order. The charter stands alone among
regional human rights instruments in its stipulation that "[e]very indi-
vidual shall have duties towards his family and society, the State and
other legally recognized communities and the international commu-
nity." 95 This differs from the European Convention, which is silent
on the matter, and the American Convention, which recognizes only
enumerated obligations to the family and the community. 96 The
Banjul Charter, however, imposes a broader duty on the individual to
regard fellow human beings without discrimination. 97 It then lists
specific duties such as respect for the family, the maintenance of par-
ents in case of need, and the preservation of the family's harmonious
development. 98
91. Id. art. 18(4).
92. European Convention, supra note 54, art. 8.
93. American Convention, supra note 54, art. 5.
94. See generally Marasinghe, Traditional Conceptions of Human Rights in Africa, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 32 (Welch & Meltzer 1984); Nwabueze,
Family Law in Nigeria, in LE DROIT DE LA FAMILLE EN AFRIQUE NOIRE ET A MADAGAS-
CAR 117 (Mlbaye 1968).
95. Banjul Charter, supra note 52, art. 27(1).
96. American Convention, supra note 54, art. 32.
97. Banjul Charter, supra note 52, art. 28.
98. Id. art. 29. The charter's broader social obligations include the duty to place one's
intellectual and physical abilities at the service of the community, to work to the best of one's
ability and competence, to preserve positive cultural values in one's relations with other mem-
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If incorporated into a South African bill of rights, these moral
obligations would serve to set a tone of morality in a country where
their denial has caused immeasurable suffering. The specific duties,
such as the duty to support one's parents, could properly be regarded
as legal obligations enforceable in courts of law. The interpretation of
these obligations and duties would present quite a challenge to South
African judges, and could possibly be one of the most vexing
problems facing the new country.
IV. AN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH
A. The Role of the Judiciary
Ideally, a majority-ruled South Africa will have a constitution
drafted with the participation of the people, containing both an Afri-
canist bill of rights and the guarantee of an independent judiciary.
Yet, even if South Africa experiences the smoothest of all possible
transitions, many problems will remain. The most important issue is
which law the judges should interpret.
Little in the South African legal heritage supports respect for
equality before the law and primacy of individual rights. Dugard has
argued that judges, even under the present system, could appeal to the
Roman-Dutch common law heritage, which favors human rights and
social justice, as well as to the English common law tradition.99 Ap-
plication of Roman-Dutch jurisprudence, however, is limited because
it is essentially a dead body of law. 100 Furthermore, in South Africa,
Roman-Dutch jurisprudence is tainted by association with the ultra-
nationalist Afrikaner judges. These jurists tried to use such jurispru-
dence to "purify" and purge South African law of British influence,
bers of the society in a spirit of tolerance, to preserve national unity and the territorial integrity
of the country, and to contribute to national defense in accordance with the law. Id.
99. Dugard, supra note 44, at 197.
100. Roman-Dutch law is usually defined as the system of law which prevailed in the
Netherlands (specifically the province of Holland) from the middle of the fifteenth century
until the age of codification. See R. LEE, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 2
(1953). The substantive private law of the Netherlands was codified in 1838. However, in
those overseas territories which the Dutch lost prior to 1838 (including the former Dutch
possessions of the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), and British Guiana (now
Guyana)), these nineteenth-century Dutch codes were never introduced. To the extent that
the new sovereign retained the prior law in those territories, it was preserved in the form of
uncodified Roman-Dutch law. Today, in Sri Lanka and to a greater extent in Guyana, the
common law has widely replaced the former Roman-Dutch system. See generally M.
SHAHABUDDEEN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF GUYANA (1973); Cooray, The Reception of Ro-
man-Dutch Law in Sri Lanka, 7 COMP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 295 (1974).
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even as they supported the worst abuses of apartheid legislation.1o1
Reliance on English jurisprudence would be more helpful, but many
British decisions are too narrow to satisfy human rights concerns that
will confront South African judges.
Routine reference to international human rights norms as bases
for judicial decision could offer a viable alternative. If judges rigor-
ously adhere to these norms, South Africa could develop an interna-
tional jurisprudence of human rights and social justice, and perhaps
establish itself in the vanguard of legal culture. In the modern global
village, where high technology increasingly shrinks distances between
people, it is desirable to harmonize legal practices as much as possible
while recognizing the uniqueness of individual situations. Accord-
ingly, it behooves judges, and the lawyers who appear before them in
domestic courts, to familiarize themselves with the growing body of
international human rights jurisprudence. 10 2  South Africa can
achieve this familiarity by implementing continuing legal education
courses for judges and lawyers modelled on the programs currently
in place in many United States jurisdictions and by transforming the
law school curriculum to emphasize the new orientation.
This approach does not undercut judicial obligation to abide by a
country's constitution, statutes, and common law. Rather, it recog-
nizes that judges, particularly in common law jurisdictions, not only
declare what the law is, but establish the law. Accordingly, judges
should be forthcoming about the nature of their choices and fully cog-
nizant of the duties and responsibilities that result. Unlike other areas
of domestic law, where international law has little or no bearing,
human rights issues require the judge to make choices with reference
to the growing international legal corpus.
Modern international human rights law derives from the United
Nations Charter which expresses "faith in fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, [and] in the equal
rights of men and women."' 0 3 The charter also provides that interna-
tional cooperation in promoting and encouraging "respect for human
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race"'0 4 is one of the purposes of the United Nations. Under Chapter
101. On the purification movement, see generally Van Blerk, The "Purists" in South Afri-
can Legal Literature and Their Influence on the Judgments of the Appellate Division in Selected
Areas, LL.M. Thesis, University of Natal, South Africa (1981).
102. S. LEE, JUDGING JuDGES (1981).
103. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 69, preamble.
104. Id. art. 1, para. 3.
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IX of the charter, member states pledge to act in cooperation with the
international body to realize its aims. The charter's special emphasis
on the international recognition of human rights stands in stark con-
trast to the Covenant of the League of Nations' silence on the
matter. 105
Leading jurists have long agreed that these provisions have re-
stricted the right of United Nations member states to treat the obser-
vance of human rights as a purely domestic matter. 0 6 The
International Court of Justice affirmed this view in its 1971 Namibia
Advisory Opinion, where it indicated that human rights had
by virtue of the Charter. . . become at international law a proper
subject for international action. There followed in 1958 the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and thereafter many General
Assembly resolutions on human rights and racial discrimination
.... There have also been various regional agreements on human
rights, perhaps the leading example being the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms of 1950.107
Today, the court could have added the Banjul Charter to this list of
regional agreements. Thus, as International Court Judge de
Ar6chaga has noted, state human rights obligations have become a
"legitimate subject of international concern."' 10 8
The international human rights approach to judicial decision-
making proposed here will certainly encounter opposition in South
Africa. Existing legal culture holds the widespread belief that inter-
national law is not part of domestic law.1 9 Had this view not pre-
vailed, more liberal judges would have drawn upon the corpus of
105. Compare U.N. CHARTER, supra note 69, with LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT.
106. See, e.g., WALDOCK, 106 RECUEIL DES CouRs 200 (1962); E. LAUTERPACHT, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 177-78 (1950); OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL
LAW 740 (1958).
107. Namibia (Advisory) Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 51.
108. E. J. de Ar6chaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, in 159 (I)
RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1, 177 (1979). His view was echoed most recently in February 1988 in Bangalore, India
at a meeting attended by high judicial officers of various commonwealth countries, as well as
the United States and Pakistan. Bangalore Principles issued by the Judicial Colloquium on the
Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms at Bangalore, India, Feb. 26,
1988 (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal).
109. S. AFR. L. COMM'N REP., supra note 27, at summary, 3(D). The section indicates
that "[t]he only 'human rights' document to which the South African government is a signa-
tory is the Charter of the United Nations, but these provisions have never been promulgated as
law." Id.
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internationally established norms when dealing with the government's
human rights abuses.
The prevailing South African view is in accord with the con-
servative approach found in common law countries other than the
United States. Jurists of this persuasion are quick to caution against
the indiscriminate adoption and application of provisions contained in
international legal instruments as if they had the authority of domes-
tic law. These jurists present a three-pronged argument for their posi-
tion. First, the international norms are not part of domestic law
unless lawmakers specifically implement them. Second, the interna-
tional instrument may not be part of the domestic law because the
executive branch did not have the legislature's support to obtain pas-
sage of a domestic law on the subject, even if it approved of the instru-
ment. In a federal state, the executive may not necessarily have the
authority or the desire to translate the norms of the international in-
strument into domestic rules. Third, the subject matter of an interna-
tional instrument may arouse such deep divisions in the society that a
judge should leave the domestic implementation of the international
norm to the legislative branch.
These reasons do not justify rejecting an international human
rights-based approach. International law commonly provides a
source for domestic law. Jurist J. L. Brierly articulated this position
as early as 1935.110 Four years later, in Chung Chi Cheung v. The
King,"' the Privy Council similarly recognized that domestic courts
could bring the common law into step with international law princi-
ples in certain instances. 12 In that case, Lord Atkin wrote that
[tihe Courts acknowledge the existence of a body of rules which
nations accept amongst themselves. On any judicial issue they seek
to ascertain what the relevant rule is, and, having found it, they
will treat it as incorporated into the domestic law, so far as it is not
inconsistent with rules enacted by statutes or finally declared by
their tribunals.1 13
More recently, the courts in many other countries have referred
to international law standards, particularly with regard to human
rights. English courts represent the forefront in this trend. In 1987,
courts in the United Kingdom, Australia, and other jurisdictions con-
110. Brierly, International Law in England, 51 L.Q. REv. 24, 31 (1935).
111. [1939] 1 A.C. 160 (P.C. 1938) (Scot.).
112. Id. at 168.
113. Id.
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sidered proceedings brought by the Attorney General of England and
Wales to restrain the publication of the book Spycatcher.114 In Attor-
ney General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2), the fundamental
principles of the European Convention figured prominently in both
the arguments of counsel and the judges' decision." 5 Both the trial
and appellate court judges were careful to demonstrate that their deci-
sions were consistent with the United Kingdom's obligations under
the European Convention and in accord with the decisions of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights." 6 The Attorney General argued
that European Court judgments did not bind an English court con-
struing the relevant provisions of the convention. The trial judge re-
jected this argument, declaring that the government's treaty
obligation had to be "given a meaning and effect consistent with the
rulings of the court established by the treaty to supervise its
application."" 1
7
The court of appeal also recognized the importance of harmoniz-
ing domestic English law with that of the convention." 8 This defer-
ence to the European Convention may stem from the fact that any
English citizen with standing to challenge the inconsistency between
English law and the obligations of the convention may bring a claim
against the United Kingdom in the European Court of Human
Rights. Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has fre-
quently found the United Kingdom in breach of the convention.
These facts taken together help to explain the English court's mount-
ing eagerness to defer to the convention and the growing body of ju-
risprudence surrounding it. "9 This does not mean, however, that the
convention and the European Court of Human Rights' jurisprudence
have actually become part of domestic law. Instead, they remain
sources to which courts show increasing willingness to turn for gui-
dance in decisions on the content of domestic law.
Another English decision underlining this point is In re K D.'
20
114. Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2), [1988] 2 W.L.R. 805, 812
(C.A. 1987).
115. Id. at 841-51.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 851.
118. Id. at 869.
119. Foster, The European Court of Justice and the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights, 8 E.C.J. & E.C.H.R. 245 (1987); Hartley, Federalism, Courts and Legal
Systems: The Emerging Constitution of the European Community, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 247
(1986).
120. [1988] 2 W.L.R. 398 (C.A. 1987).
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In that 1988 case, the House of Lords reviewed the issue of an order
terminating parental access to a ward of the court. The mother ar-
gued against the order on the ground that, unless the court affirmed
access as a parental right, English law would deny a fundamental
human right recognized by the European Convention. The judges
dismissed the mother's appeal, but did not suggest that the European
Convention was not part of English law or that its requirements were
irrelevant. Instead, the judges carefully explained that they did not
intend their decision to be inconsistent with the convention and the
European Court of Human Rights' view of its requirements. They
stated that
[s]uch conflict as exists, is ... semantic only and lies only in differ-
ing ways of giving expression to the single common concept that
the natural bond and relationship between parent and child gives
rise to universally recognised norms which ought not to be gratui-
tously interfered with and which, if interfered with at all, ought to
be so only if the welfare of the child dictates it. 121
These cases illustrate the care English courts are taking to ensure
that the domestic law is brought into line with the international
human rights norms of the European Convention. A similar judicial
appeal to international standards is occurring in many other jurisdic-
tions. For example, the Australian case of Jago v. District Court of
New South Wales122 raised the issue of whether, under the common
law, a person accused of a criminal offense has a legally enforceable
right to a speedy trial. 123 There was a delay of many years in bringing
the accused to trial and he sought a permanent stay of the proceed-
ings. The court held that while the defendant did have a right to a
fair trial, he did not have a right to a speedy trial under common law.
Nevertheless, the judges concluded that speed was an attribute of fair-
ness by referring to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 24 which Australia had ratified. This covenant guarantees an
accused the right to be "informed promptly.., of the charge against
him ... [and] tried without undue delay."'' 25
Similarly, Rangarajan v. Jagjivan Ram 126 required the Indian
Supreme Court to consider the validity of film censorship in the con-
121. Id. at 412.
122. 12 N.S.W.L.R. 558 (Austl. C.A. 1988).
123. Id.
124. 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
125. Jago, 12 N.S.W.L.R. at 569-70.
126. [1989] 1 S.C.J. 128 (S. Ct. India).
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text of freedom of expression.' 27 In allowing an appeal from a deci-
sion to revoke a film's certificate, the Supreme Court relied upon the
European Court's decision in the Handyside Case,128 and declared
that the right to freedom of expression applied not only to inoffensive
information but also to that which "offend[s], shock[s], or disturb[s]
the State or any sector of the population."' 
29
Courts in Zimbabwe and Botswana have also illustrated the per-
suasive value and substantial impact of an international human rights
approach. In Stephen Ncube v. The State, 30 the Zimbabwe Supreme
Court unanimously declared judicial corporal punishment unconstitu-
tional.' 3' The Ncube court interpreted section 15(1) of the Zimbabwe
Constitution in making its decision. Its terms are very similar to arti-
cle 3 of the European Convention, which prohibits torture or inhu-
man or degrading punishment or treatment. 3 2 The court relied
heavily upon the European Court of Human Rights' holding in Tyrer
v. United Kingdom, 133 as well as on decisions from many other juris-
dictions. Accordingly, the Zimbabwe court castigated whipping as
"contrary to the traditional humanity practiced by almost the whole
of the civilized world, being incompatible with the evolving standards
of decency."'
34
In State v. Petrus,135 the Botswana Court of Appeals considered
whether corporal punishment authorized by the Criminal Procedure
and Evidence Act conflicted with section 7 of the Botswana Constitu-
tion, which prohibits inhuman or degrading punishment.1 36 The five-
judge bench concluded unanimously that the law authorizing the pun-
ishment was ultra vires to the constitution. 37 In reaching its decision,
the court relied upon judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights, the United States Supreme Court, and a dissenting opinion in
a Privy Council case. 38
127. Id.
128. 24-2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976).
129. [1989] 1 S.C.J. at 149.
130. Judgment of Dec. 14, 1987, Supreme Court of Zimbabwe.
131. Id.
132. European Convention, supra note 54, art. 3.
133. 26-2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
134. Judgment of Dec. 14, 1987, Supreme Court of Zimbabwe.
135. [1985] L.R.C. 699.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. The opinion by Justice Maisels even thanked the counsel for the accused for provid-
ing photocopies of judgments, articles, and conventions relied upon by them in their argument
and which the court drew upon in its decision. Maisels wrote "[b]ut for this many would have
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The South African courts should follow five rules which can be
distilled from the behavior of the courts in these jurisdictions. First,
international law is not part of the domestic law in most common law
countries. Second, it does not become internalized until either
lawmakers incorporate it into domestic law, or the judges, in their
lawmaking capacity, so declare it. Third, judges will not automati-
cally incorporate these international norms even though their country
is a party to the treaty or convention which establishes them. Fourth,
if an issue of uncertainty arises, such as an ambiguity in the common
law or relevant stitute, judges may look to international law stan-
dards. Fifth, if the judges use international law standards to deter-
mine what the relevant rule of law is, by virtue of their action, the
standard may be incorporated into domestic law. Unfortunately, this
international human rights-based approach will fail if South African
judges, like their predecessors throughout South African history, are
hesitant to deliver controversial or unpopular decisions as the new
state struggles to overcome its many difficulties.
B. Executive Adherence to the Will of the Judiciary
Even if South African judges are brave enough to adopt the pro-
posed model of interpretation, their success will depend upon the will-
ingness of the executive and the people to adhere to the courts'
decisions. The South African tradition of executive supremacy fur-
nishes no model of appropriate behavior. In a country beset by myr-
iad and seemingly insurmountable social ills, there is great temptation
for the executive to whittle away constitutional human rights guaran-
tees and judicial freedom. Many otherwise enlightened South African
lawyers, who know the horrors of detention without trial and other
restraints on individual freedom, display a frightening willingness to
accept these restrictions. 139 Of course, there is no way for an activist
judiciary alone to stop abuses of executive power. Nevertheless, in-
stead of caving in to repeated executive onslaughts, as demonstrated
by some of the judges in the last of the Coloured Vote cases,140 South
been inaccessible to the Court; and, speaking for myself, the existence of many of them was
quite unknown." Id. at 702.
139. Suggestions to this effect appear in various papers from the Conference on Human
Rights in the Post-Apartheid South African Constitution, Columbia University Center for
Human Rights, New York (Sept. 25-28, 1990).
140. The Coloured Vote cases involved the government's removal of black voters from the
common roll in the Cape Province in the 1950s. The attendant legal brouhaha is described in
Dlamini, The Senate Case Revisited, 105 S. AFR. L.J. 470 (1988).
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African judges can insist on voicing their opinions in ways that seek
to control abuses of executive discretion.
For example, judicial review in Britain has become an important,
although not complete, protection for the individual in his dealings
with the executive government. In following a more activist ap-
proach, British courts have overruled the World War II case of Liver-
sidge v. Anderson.141 The Liversidge majority held that no court could
examine the reasonableness of the Secretary of State's actions.
142
Under the Defence (General) Regulations of 1939, if the Secretary
had issued in good faith an order indicating reasonable cause to be-
lieve that an individual had hostile associations, that individual could
therefore be detained. The court held that the matter was one for the
Secretary's exclusive discretion.
43
There has since developed a large body of opinion contrary to the
Liversidge decision. In Ex parte Rossminster Ltd., the House of Lords
expressly overruled Liversidge in its entirety, not just in the narrow
context of that particular case.'" In recent years, this reasoning has
pervaded decisions of British courts on matters as diverse as preven-
tive detention, prerogative powers, and administrative action. In the
1983 case of Khawaja v. Secretary of State, 45 Lord Scarman wrote
that
[t]he classic dissent of Lord Atkin in Liversidge v. Anderson ... is
now accepted as correct not only on the point of construction...
but in its declaration of English legal principle... Lord Atkin put
it thus... "that in English law every imprisonment is prima facie
unlawful, and that it is for the person directing imprisonment to
justify his act."' 146
The following year, the House of Lords overturned long-estab-
lished barriers to the review of prerogative powers. In Council of Civil
141. [1941] 3 All E.R. 338 (H.L.).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. [1980] A.C. 952 (H.L. 1979). Lord Diplock wrote that "the time has come to ac-
knowledge openly that the majority of this House in Liversidge v. Anderson was expediently
and at that time, perhaps, excusably, wrong and the dissenting speech of Lord Atkin was
correct." Id. at 1011. In still stronger wording, Lord Scarman argued that
[t]he ghost of Liversidge v. Anderson... therefore casts no shadow ... [a]nd I would
think it need no longer haunt the law. It was laid to rest by Lord Radcliffe in Nak-
kuda All v. Jayaratne... and no one in this case has sought to revive it. It is now
beyond recall.
Id. at 1024-25.
145. [1983] 1 All E.R. 765 (H.L.).
146. Id. at 781.
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Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service,147 Lord Roskill ac-
cepted that certain prerogative powers were not susceptible to judicial
review. 48 These were the making of treaties, the defense of the realm,
the prerogative of mercy, the appointment of ministers, the grant of
honor, and the dissolution of Parliament. 49 However, he also de-
clared himself
unable to see ... that there is any logical reason why the fact that
the source of the power is the prerogative and not statute should
today deprive the citizen of that right of challenge to the manner of
its exercise which he would possess were the source of the power
statutory. 150
Lord Scarman echoed these sentiments and expressed the majority
view that "if the subject matter in respect of which prerogative power
is exercised is . . . a matter on which the court can adjudicate, the
exercise of the power is subject to review in accordance with the prin-
ciples developed in respect of the review of the exercise of statutory
power."' 15  These views on judicial review have been expressed in
other commonwealth jurisdictions as diverse as Singapore and
Zimbabwe and also in international bodies such as the Inter-Ameri-
can Court. 5
2
The efficacy of safeguards for the protection of fundamental
human rights, particularly in times of national crisis, depends upon
the courts' willingness to scrutinize rigorously the exercise of execu-
tive discretion and to impose legal limits on the scope of that power.
Without such independent judicial scrutiny and control, societies are,
as Lord Shaw wrote in his dissenting opinion in R. v. Halliday,'53 in
peril of experiencing a swift "transition to arbitrary government."'' 54
However, a courageous judiciary cannot single-handedly guard
against such arbitrary government. Governments must display a
readiness to respect judicial decisions and the rule of law. Otherwise,
as former Chief Justice Dumbutshena of Zimbabwe has written, there
147. [1984] 3 All E.R. 935 (H.L.).
148. Id. at 956.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 948.
152. See, e.g., Teo Soh Lung v. Minister of Home Affairs, (Civil Appeal No. 81 of 1988,
Judgment of Dec. 8, 1988); Minister of Home Affairs v. Austin, Supreme Court of Zimbabwe;
Inter-American Court, Advisory Opinion, OC-8/87 of Jan. 30, 1987, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 512
(1988).
153. [1917] A.C. 260 (H.L.).
154. Id. at 287.
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will be "the inevitable breakdown of law and order, resulting in unciv-
ilized chaos because the Courts cannot enforce their own orders.
1' 55
While judicial activism may not stop the executive from carrying out
nefarious deeds, it can at least serve to keep alive for the masses no-
tions of human rights and social justice. Indeed, it is with the people
that the greatest challenges for any new order lie.
C. Popular Support
For decades, South Africa's black masses have endured a system
which has relegated them to lives of perpetual servitude, subject to the
harshness of discriminatory and often brutal legislation, and in which
they share none of the power, wealth, or privilege of their white com-
patriots. For them, the all-white executive which promulgates laws
made without their consent, the white judges who interpret the laws
to their disadvantage, and the security forces and Afrikaner-domi-
nated bureaucracy that claim to carry out the laws are all part of an
illegitimate system.
It would be naive to assume that simply because a new South
Africa is majority-ruled, black people would automatically believe
that the new government is just. The white authorities have long
found willing black collaborators driven by poverty, greed, or lust for
power. Such collaborators include homeland leaders, members of the
Coloured and Asian Houses of the tricameral parliament, and police
informers.156 Blacks have no reason to think that those ready to trade
morality for personal gain will disappear with a transformed South
Africa. Moreover, they have no cause to believe that just because the
government is black-dominated, its leaders, even if democratically
elected, will be incorruptible.
Many black South Africans have a carefully cultivated cynicism
with which they view political wheeling and dealing. While such cyn-
icism may aid in the creation of a vibrant democratic order, it may
also threaten a fragile government whose members feel that the abro-
gation of civil liberties is justified to ensure economic development.
Compounding the danger of the government's departure from human
rights principles is the threat posed by urban youths who have known
only the brutalization of apartheid. Uneducated, unemployed, and
embittered, they will undoubtedly form an impatient, vocal, and po-
155. Minister of Home Affairs v. Austin, Zimbabwe Supreme Court at 572.
156. On black collaborators, see generally L. THOMPSON & A. PRIOR, SOUTH AFRICAN
POLITICS (1982).
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tentially violent urban proletariat demanding a pace of change to
which no government can adhere. 5 7 These youths will have no rea-
son to believe in any notion of the rule of law.
If blacks view a new government with suspicion, the suspicion
with which they view the judiciary will be all the greater. Genera-
tions of black South Africans have seen the judiciary as the coy hand-
maiden of the executive. Why should blacks suddenly believe that
with a new government and constitution, judges will become bold de-
fenders of individual rights and liberties? This is especially so if the
judges, for an initial period at least, remain the same white males now
in office. What effect will that have on black conceptions of the rule
of law? If the same judges who one day defend white domination, the
next day proclaim themselves guardians of freedom and equal rights
for all, the blacks' view of the judiciary will be unchanged. They will
continue to believe that the rule of law is really the rule of legalism,
merely a front for the interests of whomever happens to be in power.
Even as there are more and more black judges, why should citizens
believe that these unelected officials are anything but the govern-
ment's puppets?
Some South African legal scholars feel that if the judiciary is to
disassociate itself from the executive behavior it condoned under
supremacy gone haywire, South Africa must adopt an American-style
model of judicial review. 158 However, that is a particularly weak ar-
gument which fails to consider the nature of judicial review in the
United States. 159 First, the doctrine of judicial review developed
neither overnight nor in the crucible of profound social upheavals
such as South Africa will experience before a stable order emerges.
Second, Americans, for whom judicial positivism has little appeal,
clearly recognize that the unelected judges make political decisions
that have far-reaching consequences. Witness, for example, the con-
troversy surrounding every nomination of a United States Supreme
Court justice, and the brouhaha that precedes and follows every ma-
jor Supreme Court decision. Third, the system survives in the United
States because, although the people are often deeply divided over the
political views of the Justices and the content of their opinions, with
rare exceptions, they agree on the sanctity of the institution and the
157. See Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 1990, at A29.
158. See generally Cameron, Judicial Accountability in South Africa, 6 S. AFR. J. HUM.
RTs. 251 (1990).
159. On the development of judicial review in the United States, see generally A. Cox,
THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1987).
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desirability of its continued existence. Thus, they are prepared to
abide by the Court's decisions, however unpalatable in some quarters.
The South African situation is radically different. In the transi-
tion from one system to another, there will be no time to develop a
new legal culture. In some sense, providing for judicial review in the
new order will be like building in shifting desert sands. Black South
Africans have no cause to believe in the inviolability of the institution
of judicial review, regardless of their sentiments about the individual
justices. They have no depth of feeling about the necessity for such
review as a check on the power of other branches of government.
How then will a new government be able to establish a culture of
respect for the rule of law among the masses? Such respect cannot be
achieved through nationalistic propaganda. Rather, its creation re-
quires an executive that is both benevolent and benign and a judiciary
unafraid to castigate deviations from internationally accepted stan-
dards of human rights. Its maintenance demands vigilance. Such
desires are difficult to realize even in the most stable societies. Regret-
tably, a transformed South Africa will be saddled with innumerable
social and economic ills, including rampant poverty, unemployment,
disease, and violence. At the same time, it will inherit a particularly
sordid legacy of executive megalomania and judicial collusion.
Should these obstacles prove insurmountable, South African history
may repeat itself in tragic fashion.
V. CONCLUSION
In recent years, threats to the South African government's domi-
nation increased from without and within. Internal black protests
and political organizing have reached unprecedented levels. Pressure
from anti-apartheid groups around the world has persuaded many
members of the international community to bring pressure on the
government through economic sanctions and diplomatic moves. With
the advent of an independent Namibia, South Africa has become the
only country in Africa still ruled by a white minority government.
Already, the eyes of the international community are focussed on
South Africa as the next target for change.
Recognizing and fearing the inevitability of black majority rule,
the white politico-legal establishment which rules South Africa has
recently emphasized the introduction of a bill of rights for the coun-
try. As discussion of this issue has raged in white political circles, the
ANC has also turned its attention to the issue, while it grapples with
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the question of a post-apartheid legal order. Both sides are in particu-
lar disagreement over the issues of economic and minority rights.
One way to harmonize these differences is for drafters to adopt a
South African bill of rights that draws upon the Banjul Charter. Reli-
ance on the charter would result in the creation of a document that is
both Africanist and internationalist in orientation by appealing to in-
ternational standards of human rights, particularly those which are
widely recognized in the rest of Africa. However, such a document
alone would not free the new country from abuses by the judiciary
and the executive. Historically, the South African judiciary has sup-
ported the executive to the detriment of blacks. One way that noble-
minded judges in a new South Africa could shed this sorry legacy
would be through the regular appeal to international standards of
human rights as bases for decision. Such an approach would enable
South Africa to develop an international jurisprudence of human
rights and social justice, placing itself at the forefront of legal culture.
This approach also comports with that taken evermore frequently by
commonwealth courts as well as by the European Court of Human
Rights and the Inter-American Court.
Even if the judges follow an internationalist path, obstacles will
remain which may prove to be a new South Africa's undoing. First,
there is the problem of executive adherence to judicial will. If the
executive refuses to abide by judicial decisions, the effectiveness of the
entire legal system will be undermined. Second, blacks may not re-
spect the rule of law, as they have known law only as an instrument
for the denial of their legitimate right to self-determination in their
homeland. Blacks have little cause to believe that under a new sys-
tem, judges (even black judges) will be defenders of equality and so-
cial justice. Nevertheless, people of good will in South Africa must
strive to overcome these difficulties. If they fail, the result may be too
horrific to contemplate.
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